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      ABSTRACT 
We provide direct evidence on the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) by 
examining how frequently individual professional forecasters revise their forecasts. We draw 
interest rate and unemployment rate forecasts from the monthly Wall Street Journal surveys 
conducted between 2003 and 2013. Consistent with the sticky information model we find 
that forecasters frequently leave their forecasts unrevised but find evidence that revision 
frequency increases following larger changes in the information set. We also find revision 
frequencies became more sensitive to new information after the 2008 financial crisis but only 
weak evidence that frequent revisers forecast more accurately. 
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I. Introduction 
 How economic agents process information to form expectations continues to be a central 
issue in macroeconomics.  Recent work proposes alternatives to the full information, rational 
expectations model that presumes agents form expectations from complete information and 
revise them when new, relevant information appears.  Woodford (2003) relaxes the full 
information assumption to develop a model in which agents extract signals from noisy 
information (the noisy information model).1 Sims (2003) considers limits to information 
processing which lead rational agents to form expectations from incomplete information (the 
rational inattention model).  Reis (2006) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) posit significant costs of 
acquiring and processing information which deter agents from updating their information sets 
and revising their expectations every time new information arrives (the sticky information 
model). 
 Mankiw et al. (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) uncover empirical 
evidence consistent with the sticky information model by examining indirectly the frequency 
with which professional forecasters revise their forecasts. 2    Specifically, Mankiw et al. 
simulate inflation forecasts of agents who collect new information and revise their forecasts at 
different points in time using their sticky information model and then compare the dispersion in 
the simulated forecasts to the dispersion in actual forecasts made by professional forecasters (and 
by consumers).  They find that the simulated series mirrors the actual series most closely when 
the simulated forecasters revise their inflation expectations about every 10 months (12.5 
                                                          
1 Imperfect information was also the source of the short-run effects on output of monetary policy in models such as 
Lucas (1972). 
2 Leduc and Sill (2013)  report that changes in professional economists’ expectations are a “quantitatively important  
driver of economic fluctuations” and Adam and Padula (2011) find that using professional forecasts to proxy 
inflation expectations allows the New Keynesian Phillips curve to better explain U.S. inflation dynamics. 
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months).3  Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) assume that professional forecasters make full 
information, rational expectations forecasts but costs prevent them from revising their forecasts 
every period. They estimate the frequency of forecast revision by regressing average forecast 
errors for a specific horizon on the revision of the average forecast. They conclude that 
forecasters revise their inflation forecasts once every 6 to7 months, on average.4 
 Andrade and LeBihan (2013) also uncover empirical evidence on the sticky information 
model but instead of measuring forecast revision frequency indirectly, they do so directly by 
measuring the fraction of forecasters revising their forecasts using the quarterly European Survey 
of Professional Forecasters. They find that, on average, forecasters update their inflation 
forecasts about every 4 months, more frequently than found by Mankiw et al. (2003) and 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).5  
 In this paper we produce evidence on the sticky information model using direct measures 
of forecast revision, like Andrade and LeBihan (2013), but compared with prior research we 
subject the sticky information model to more rigorous testing by using forecasts from the survey 
of professional forecasters conducted by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). The WSJ surveys 
forecasters monthly, permitting more frequent forecast revisions than possible with the quarterly 
(US and European) Surveys of Professional Forecasters or the semi-annual Livingston Survey. 
Additionally, the WSJ survey publishes the names of forecasters together with their forecasts, 
                                                          
3 Mankiw et al. (2003) use the Livingston Survey for professional forecasters and the Michigan Survey of Consumer 
Attitudes and Behavior for consumer expectations. Carroll (2003) also finds that households appear to revise their 
expectations, at least partly based on professional forecasts, about once a year. 
4 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) use the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).  Mertens and 
Nason (2015) use forecasts of the GDP deflator from the SPF to estimate a model similar to that of Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko  (2012) in assuming that forecasts are a weighted average of last period’s forecast and the rational 
expectation using an unobserved components model of inflation. They allow the weight on the past forecast to vary 
over time and find that forecasters reduced their revision frequency from about every 5 months in the 1970s to about 
every 7-8 months after 2000.  
5 Andrade and LeBihan (2013) use the quarterly European Survey of Professional Forecasters. Armantier et 
al.(2015) conduct an experiment on how households revise their inflation expectations and find that 42-47 percent 
do not revise their expectations when given the opportunity. 
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giving forecasters incentives to forecast carefully. Publication of forecasts with forecaster names 
allows us to identify which forecasters did or did not revise their forecasts for a specific target 
date each month. We examine forecasts of the 10-year Treasury bond rate, the federal funds rate, 
and the unemployment rate because survey participants forecast their values for specific days or 
months rather than forecast averages of their values over rolling horizons, as in many other 
surveys. Compared with forecasts of averages, single-date forecasts allow a cleaner measure of 
the frequency with which agents change their forecasts of future events since they exclude 
revisions due to the correction of earlier forecast errors.6 Additionally, our data permit us to test 
whether the frequency of forecast revision is state dependent by testing whether forecasters 
revise their forecasts more frequently the more the variables they forecast fluctuate, a test not 
possible in the basic model of Coibion and Gorodnicheko (2012) which assumes that the 
frequency of forecast revision is constant through time. 
To preview our results, we find direct support for the sticky-information model in that 
substantial numbers of forecasters do not revise their forecasts at each opportunity.  The fraction 
varies with the variable forecasted.  The fraction is also state dependent: forecasters are more 
likely to revise their forecasts the greater the change in the variable being forecasted since the 
previous survey. While forecasters often do not revise at every opportunity, we find that the 
duration between revisions is shorter than that reported by most previous studies, casting some 
doubt on how well the sticky information model can account for persistence of shocks at the 
quarterly frequency. We find only weak evidence that forecasters who revise their forecasts 
infrequently forecast less accurately.  
                                                          
6 For example if we are forecasting the average annual inflation rate for 2014 and we make our new forecast in, say, 
May 2014 after observing the monthly inflation rate for April 2014, we may change our forecast by replacing our 
previous expectation of the April 2014 inflation with the actual value. We would be classified as revising our 
forecast even if we did not change our expectations of monthly inflation for months from May to December. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses our data. Section III 
describes how we test for state dependence in the frequency of revisions and reports our results.  
Section IV presents extensions of our basic model.  Section V concludes our paper.  
II. The Data 
A. The Wall Street Journal Survey  
 We take our data from the Wall Street Journal surveys of professional economic 
forecasters from March 2003 through December 2013. The survey participants include the chief 
economists from large banks and investment banks, heads of forecasting firms, and prominent 
business economists from industry.  The economists submit forecasts of several economic 
variables in the first or second week of each month and the WSJ publishes the forecasts on-line 
shortly thereafter. 7   Economists’ names and employers appear along with their forecasts, unlike 
the Livingston Survey or the (US and European) Surveys of Professional Forecasters. This is 
important because it permits us to document forecast revisions of individual economists even 
when they move to other industry positions and to ensure that we only record revisions for 
individuals who participated in consecutive surveys.8  Over our sample period the number of 
economists in each panel ranges from 45 to 60, averaging about 54.  The 101 economists who 
provided forecasts during our sample period represent 96 different employers of which 22% are 
commercial banks, 14% investment banks, 15% investment advisors, 28% forecasting firms, and 
the rest are other financial firms, nonfinancial firms, professional associations and universities.   
 Features of the WSJ survey make it well-suited for investigating the sticky information 
model.  The WSJ asks economists to predict the June 30 and December 31 values for the 10-year 
                                                          
7 Monthly surveys began in March 2003 although until 2008 no forecasts were collected at the beginning of January 
or July. The web site is: http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#ind=gdp&r=20.  Before March 2003 the WSJ 
surveyed economists twice a year.  For an analysis of the semi-annual forecasts, see Mitchell and Pearce (2007). 
8 Engelberg et al. (2011, footnote 9) mention that id numbers for the Survey of Professional Forecasts do not 
necessarily identify the same individuals over time. 
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Treasury bond rate and the federal funds rate and the June and December unemployment rate, 
inter alia. (Before June 2007 the WSJ requested forecasts of the unemployment rate for May and 
November).  Since end dates are fixed economists’ forecast horizons decline over time, from 12 
months to one.  Survey participants can potentially access very recent information before making 
their forecasts.  Specifically, current interest rate data are available almost contemporaneously. 
The unemployment rate for a given month is announced on the first Friday of the next month, 
generally in time for participants to incorporate this rate into their information sets before 
reporting their new unemployment rate forecasts to the WSJ.9 
Figure 1 shows economists’ forecasts of the 10-year bond rate by target date made 11 
months ahead of the target date (Panel A), 5 months ahead (Panel B), and 2 months ahead (Panel 
C).10  Horizontal bars indicate the actual rates on the target dates (June 30 or December 31).  The 
forecasts reflect generally sharp differences of opinion among the economists, as is typical for 
surveys of forecasts (cf. Mankiw and Reis, 200311).  Unsurprisingly, the 11-months-ahead 
forecasts exhibit the largest spreads, with 200 basis points or more separating the lowest and 
highest forecast for a given target date in most instances.  Five-months-ahead bond-rate forecasts 
show ranges of slightly less than 200 basis points while 2-months-ahead forecasts show ranges of 
about 100 basis points. Patton and Timmermann (2010) find a similar decline in the dispersion of 
forecasts as the horizon decreases. Interestingly none of the economists surveyed foresaw the 
2008 plunge in the bond rate from the 3.5% - 4% range in January through October to 2.25% at 
                                                          
9 The survey results posted contain some apparent errors.  In instances where a forecaster’s prediction is 
substantially different from the prediction for the same target date in the preceding and succeeding surveys, we 
consider the prediction a probable transcription error.  For example one forecaster predicted that the December 31, 
2008 value of the 10-year bond rate would be 3.88 percent in the September survey, 1.27 percent in the October 
survey and 3.68 percent in the November survey. Appendix A lists the probable errors.  We omit the questionable 
data points in the reported results but including them has little effect. 
10 These horizons were chosen as representative of long range, middle range and short range forecasts.  We do not 
use 12-month and 1- month ahead forecasts of interest rates because these only started in 2008. 
11 Reasons for the dispersion of forecasts include diversity in prior beliefs and differences in how forecasters 
interpret new information. See Manzan (2011).  
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year-end, even as late as the beginning of November (2-month ahead forecast for December 31, 
2008).  
Figure 2 displays economists’ forecasts of the fed funds rate 11, 5, and 2 months ahead of 
the target dates (Panels A, B and C, respectively). Figure 2 shows that most economists’ fed 
funds rate forecasts are forecasts of monetary policy as characterized by the Federal Reserve’s 
fed funds rate target.  This is most apparent prior to mid-December 2008 when the Fed changed 
the fed funds rate target in multiples of 25 basis points, leading economists to make forecasts 
spaced at 25-basis-point intervals.  Thereafter the Fed reset the fed funds rate target to a range of 
0 to 25 basis points and issued forward guidance indicating that the rate would be kept at this 
lower bound for a considerable time.12 Nevertheless, the 11-months-ahead funds rate forecasts 
reveal a wide range of opinion on Fed policy post-2008, with forecast spreads frequently 
exceeding 200 basis points (Panel A). Apparently the Fed’s forward guidance did not convince 
many of the survey participants. As in the case of the bond rate, the surveyed economists failed 
to foresee the dramatic fall in the funds rate in late 2008 even two months prior to year end. 
Figure 3, Panels A-C show the economists’ unemployment rate forecasts 10, 4 and 2 
months ahead of the target dates.  (The different forecast horizons stem from differences in the 
WSJ survey for the unemployment rate pre-and post-2008, which make 11- and 5-months-ahead 
forecasts unavailable for our whole sample period.) Like the economists’ interest rate forecasts, 
their unemployment rate forecasts exhibit greater differences between high and low predictions 
for longer horizons: for the 10-month ahead forecasts the ranges are 1.5 to 2 percentage points 
while for the 4-month-ahead forecasts the ranges drop to around 1 to 1.5 percentage points.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the ranges for the unemployment rate forecasts 2-months ahead are still 
                                                          
12 See Campbell et al.(2012) for the specifics of forward guidance post-2008. 
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about 1 percentage point or more for most surveys. The plots also show that economists did not 
foresee the deep recession that pushed up the unemployment rate in late 2008 and 2009 10 or 
even 4 months ahead.    
B. Forecast Revisions 
 To investigate possible information rigidity we construct a direct measure of economists’ 
forecast revision behavior.  For each survey date t we first compute the number of economists 
who supplied forecasts on both survey dates t-1 and t and then compute the fraction of those 
economists who did not revise their forecasts. We denote this fraction as Nochanget.  Nochanget  
is similar conceptually to the proportion of forecasters not updating, a measure estimated by 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).  Unlike their measure, Nochanget is a direct measure of not 
updating which requires no assumptions about forecasting method or forecaster rationality.13 
 Figure 4 displays Nochanget for the 10-year bond rate, fed funds rate, and unemployment 
rate at each forecast horizon averaged across all surveys in our sample period.  For the 10-year 
bond rate Nochanget averages about one-third for horizons of two to twelve months and about 
one-eighth for a horizon of one month. These averages imply that the WSJ economists revised 
their forecasts about twice every three months (twice every three surveys) for horizons of 2 to 12 
months and nearly every month for horizons of one month. The greater revision rate at the one-
month horizon appears to raise the revision rate at the seven-month horizon from two-thirds to 
three-quarters: when economists make their one-month-ahead forecasts at the start of June 
(December) for the June 30 (December 31) actual bond rate they also make their seven-months-
ahead forecasts for December 31 (June 30).  
                                                          
13 Changes in revision frequency could arise due to changes in the composition of the panel of forecasters.  While 
there is turnover in the panel, about two-thirds of all revisions are from participants who responded to about eighty 
percent of the surveys.  See Engelberg et al. (2011) for a discussion of how changing compositions could affect the 
usefulness of using mean or consensus forecasts.   
8 
 
 Economists in the WSJ survey revise their fed funds rate forecasts less frequently than 
their 10-year bond rate forecasts. Nochanget for the fed funds rate averages between 55 and 65 
percent for all forecast horizons, with no apparent relationship between average Nochanget and 
horizon length.  These metrics imply that economists revise their forecasts of monetary policy 
about twice every 5 months.   
The economists’ revision behavior for unemployment rate forecasts resembles their 
revision behavior for the 10-year bond rate. The economists failed to revise their unemployment 
rate forecasts 30 to 45 percent of the time with no apparent relationship between revision 
frequency and forecast horizon.14 This implies that they revise their forecasts about twice every 
three months on average, similar to their revision frequency for the bond rate.   
The behavior of Nochanget both contrasts with and confirms work by Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012). The average revision frequencies we compute for bond rate, fed funds 
rate and unemployment rate forecasts by economists in the WSJ survey are greater than the 
revision frequencies Coibion and Gorodnichenko estimate for forecasts of inflation and other 
variables by economists in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. These differences may reflect 
the difference between monthly and quarterly surveys.15  Our finding that substantial proportions 
of forecasters do not revise their forecasts at every opportunity supports Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s interpretation of their results as originating from costly revision rather than 
noisy information.  The higher frequency of revision that we find does, however, cast doubt on 
                                                          
14 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) report that their measure of information rigidity did not appear to vary across 
forecast horizon. 
15  Estimates reported in Figure1, Panel B of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) imply times to forecast revision for 
a long-term interest rate (the AAA bond rate), a short-term interest rate (the three-month Treasury Bill rate), and the 
unemployment rate of about 3.6 months, about 4.5 months, and about 5 months respectively. Andrade and LeBihan 
(2013) report that forecasters in the European Survey of Professional Forecasters revise their forecasts about once 
every four months.  Of course, quarterly data restrict the frequency of revision to a minimum of once every 3 
months.  Mankiw et al. (2003) report substantially less frequent revisions, once every 10-12 months. 
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whether infrequent revision of expectations can account for the persistent effects of shocks at a 
quarterly frequency. 
 Our plots of Nochanget reflect average revision frequency of individual economists.  To 
reflect heterogeneity of revision frequency we construct histograms showing the distribution of 
economists by frequency of non-revision. For each economist we compute the percentage of 
non-revisions to previous forecasts of the 10-year bond rate, fed funds rate, and unemployment 
rate. We restrict our sample to those economists having at least 25 opportunities to revise their 
forecasts. Figure 5 presents our histograms. Ten categories of unrevised forecast percentages 
appear on the horizontal axis; the percentage of forecasters in each category appears on the 
vertical axis. Forecasters who always revise their forecasts at every opportunity (never revise 
their forecasts) are included in the unrevised forecasts category 0-10% (91-100%).   
 Economists in the WSJ survey show considerable heterogeneity in revising their 10-year 
bond rate forecasts (Panel A).  The 79 economists with 25 or more chances to revise their bond 
rate forecasts have percentages of unrevised forecasts falling into 8 decile categories (0-10% 
through 71-80%).  The modal category, 11-20%, includes just over 25% of economists; the next 
most populous category, 41-50%, slightly less than 20% of economists. The percentages of 
economists with unrevised forecasts between 0 and 30% and between 31 and 60% are nearly 
equal (about 45% each).  
The economists show more homogeneity in revising their fed funds rate forecasts as well 
as greater reluctance to revise (Panels B and C).  Eighty-three economists have 25 or more 
chances to revise their forecasts over our entire sample period (Panel B).  The modal category, 
61-70%, includes over 30% of the economists. The percentages of economists with unrevised 
forecasts between 41 and 60% and between 61 and 80% are nearly equal (about 45% each). We 
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also create a histogram using sample forecasts prior to the era of quantitative easing, from 2003 
through 2008 (Panel C).  Sixty-nine economists have 25 or more chances to revise their forecasts 
in this time frame.  The histogram for this period lies slightly to the left of the full-period 
histogram. The modal category, 51-60% unrevised forecasts, includes nearly 30% of the 
economists. The categories on either side of the modal category contain only slightly smaller 
percentages of economists (around 25% each).    
The economists’ unemployment rate revision frequency and heterogeneity fall between 
those of their bond rate forecasts and their fed funds rate forecasts (Panel D).  The 81 economists 
with 25 or more chances to revise their unemployment rate forecasts have percentages of 
unrevised forecasts in 7 categories (0-10% through 61-70%). The modal category, 31-40%, 
includes nearly 35% of economists; the categories on either side of the modal category each 
include about 20% of the economists.  The percentage of economists with unrevised forecasts 
between 21% and 60% is slightly less than 90%.16 
 The foregoing evidence on forecast revision frequency is consistent with the notion that 
the costs of acquiring and processing information prevent forecasters from updating their 
forecasts each time new information becomes available.  This evidence begs the question of 
whether the forecast revision process varies with changes in the economy which cause 
information to be more or less sticky.  Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) assume in their 
framework that the frequency of revision is not state dependent, although they find evidence that 
                                                          
16 We also investigated the role of employer type in forecast revision behavior. The sticky-information model would 
explain systematic differences in revision behavior across employer groups by differences in the costs of updating 
and processing information and differences in the perceived costs of unrevised forecasts. The employer groups are 
commercial banks, investment banks, investment-advising firms, forecasting and research firms, insurance 
companies, other financial institutions such as Fannie Mae, bond-rating firms, academia, professional associations, 
and nonfinancial institutions.  Using the subsample of economists who responded to at least 25 surveys we compute 
the mean frequency of non-revision for economists in each of ten employer categories. Our tests indicate that only 
economists employed by “other” financial institutions and bond-rating firms have significantly different mean 
revision rates: they revise their forecasts more frequently than their counterparts at other employer groups. They 
represent only about 5 percent of the WSJ economists, however. 
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more volatile periods exhibit less information stickiness.17  We address this question in the next 
section. 
III. Is the Degree of Information Stickiness State Dependent? 
 
A. The Models  
 Empirically testing the state dependency of forecasters’ forecast revision process requires 
us to model changes in the information set for the economy. While we cannot measure all the 
incoming information that forecasters might access, one seemingly important piece of 
information is the amount of recent change in the variable being forecasted.  Specifically, an  
efficient market for 10-year government bonds should imbed all recent information into the 
current rate, making rate changes since the last survey a good measure of new information. 
Likewise, announced changes in the fed funds rate target and subsequent funds rate changes 
should convey information relevant to forecasters, particularly given the Federal Reserve’s 
reluctance to change directions frequently. Similarly, persistence in unemployment rate changes 
should lead forecasters to interpret recent unemployment rate changes as informative. A practical 
advantage of representing changes in the information set by changes in the actual variables 
forecasted is that these variables are available to all economists contemporaneously at virtually 
no cost.18  
 Some extreme examples illustrate the effect of information set changes on forecasts. 
Specifically, after the Fed lowered the fed funds rate target by 125 basis points in January 2008 
all economists in the February 2008 survey revised their fed funds rate predictions for June 30, 
                                                          
17 Coibion and Gorodnicheko (2012) report evidence that forecasters revise less frequently during the Great 
Moderation, perhaps making the economy more vulnerable to large shocks subsequently. They note that “recessions, 
as periods of increased volatility, should be times when economic agents update and process information faster than 
in expansions since the (relative) cost of ignoring macroeconomic shocks in recession rises.” (page 26) 
18 Later in the paper we use changes in the fed funds rate target in addition to changes in the fed funds rate itself.  
The fed funds rate target is also available contemporaneously to all economists at virtually no cost. 
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2008 and nearly all revised their predictions for December 31, 2008.  Similarly, after seeing the 
funds rate target fall by 100 basis points during October 2008 nearly all economists in the 
November 2008 survey revised their fed funds rate forecasts for December 31, 2008.19   
 We use the timing of the WSJ survey to define our change variables. We do not observe 
the exact date on which a given economist submits a forecast and, hence, do not know the most 
recent values of the variables the economist observed before submitting a forecast. We do know, 
however, that the WSJ assembles its surveys in the first or second week of each month, leading 
us to compute the change in the actual  bond rate, fed funds rate, and fed funds rate target from 
the last business day of the month before the last survey to the last business day of the month 
before the current survey. Analogously, we compute the change in the unemployment rate as the 
difference between the unemployment rates announced at the start of the previous month and the 
start of the survey month.20 
 Our forecast revision model relates the fraction of economists not revising their 
predictions (Nochanget) to the previous month’s absolute change in the variable forecasted (bond 
rate, |∆it-1|; fed funds rate, |∆ffrt-1|; or unemployment rate, |∆Ut-1|) and the forecast horizon 
(Horizont).  While Figure 4 suggests that forecast horizon may not affect the value of Nochanget 
in forecasts of the fed funds rate or the unemployment rate, the figure does not hold recent 
changes in the variables constant. The simplest model has the following form:  
 Nochanget  =   α   +   β  |∆variablet-1|   +   γ Horizont + et  (1) 
                                                          
19 The effects of announced changes in fed funds rate targets on economists’ fed funds rate forecasts are similar to 
the effects Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) report for the 9-11 attack on immediate forecasts of economic 
activity. 
20 The Bureau of Labor Statistics announces the unemployment rate on the first Friday of a month for the previous 
month. Thus, for example, we presume that economists submitting their March 2010 unemployment rate forecasts 
for June 2010 have observed the change in the unemployment rate from January 2010 to February 2010. We use the 
announced unemployment rates in the real-time data set from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see 
Croushore and Stark, 2001) to insure that survey participants had access to this information since there are slight 
adjustments subsequent to the initial unemployment rate announcements. 
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where et is a random error term.  We expect larger absolute changes in it-1, ffrt-1 and Ut-1 to cause 
more economists to revise their forecasts, leading β to be negative. The sign of γ is unclear: 
Figure 4 shows that the unconditional average of Nochanget may rise or fall as the target date 
becomes more distant.  Since equation (1) restricts Horizont to having a linear effect on 
Nochanget we relax this restriction by estimating equation (2):  
 Nochanget =   α   +   β  |∆variablet-1|    +    Σj=sj=S γj Djt   +   et  (2) 
where Djt is a zero-one indicator for forecast horizon of length j.21   
 The design of the WSJ survey leads us to estimate equations (1) and (2) for two different 
forecast horizons. To illustrate, consider the March survey.  This survey reports economists’ 
bond rate, fed funds rate and unemployment rate forecasts at the start of March for the ends of 
June and December, 4 months ahead and 10 months ahead, respectively.22  More generally every 
survey reports two forecasts for every economist for every variable: a shorter-horizon forecast 
(1- to 6-months ahead) and a longer-horizon forecast (7- to 12-months ahead).   We estimate 
equations (1) and (2) separately on data for short- and long-horizon forecasts.  In estimates on 
short-horizon data, Horizon = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and j = {2,3,4,5,6} with j=1 being the omitted 
category; in estimates on long-horizon data, Horizon = {7,8,9,10,11,12} and j = {8,9,10,11,12} 
with j=7 being the omitted category. 
B. Estimated Models of 10-year Bond Rate Forecasts 
 Table 1 reports estimates of our models of Nochanget for the 10-year bond rate using 
short-horizon forecasts (columns 1.1-1.3) and long-horizon forecasts (columns 1.4-1.6) from the 
                                                          
21  Since our dependent variable ranges from zero to one, OLS could give misleading results since it does not impose 
this restriction.  To address this possibility we also estimated the models using the quasi-maximum-likelihood 
estimation method of Papke and Wooldridge (1996). These results are very similar to the OLS results and are 
reported in Appendix B. 
22  Before June 2007 the WSJ survey reported economists’ unemployment rate forecasts for May and November. 
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2003-2013 sample period.23 Estimates of equation (1) show that longer forecast horizons result 
in fewer forecast revisions while larger bond rate changes result in more forecast revisions.  
Column (1.1) shows that more than 31% of economists do not revise their forecasts with a one-
month horizon and no change in the bond rate from the previous month (.292 + .023). This 
fraction increases by about 2 percentage points with each additional horizon month for horizons 
of up to 6 months. Column (1.4) shows that nearly 37% of economists do not revise their 
forecasts with a 7-month horizon and no change in bond rate from the previous month (.243 + 
.018 x 7). This fraction increases by nearly 2 percentage points with each added horizon month 
for horizons of up to 12 months. A two-standard-deviation change in the bond rate since the last 
survey, about 38 basis points, reduces the fraction of non-revising economists by about 13 
percentage points for short-horizon forecasts (0.378 x -0.348) and by about 11 percentage points 
for  long-horizon forecasts (.378 x -0.302).  
   Estimates of equation (2) show that forecast horizon length has a non-linear impact on 
bond rate forecast revisions, with significantly more economists revising their forecasts 1- and 7-
months ahead of a target date than in other months.  In column (1.2) the estimated coefficients of 
the five short-horizon indicators D2,..,D6 are jointly significant and positive but not significantly 
different from one another.  An analogous statement applies to the estimated coefficients of the 
long-horizon indicators D8,...,D12 in column (1.5). These outcomes lead us to estimate variants of 
equation (2) with a single binary indicator for a 1-month horizon in the short-horizon model 
(column 1.3) and a single binary indicator for a 7-month horizon in the long-horizon model 
(column 1.6). The model estimates indicate that with no change in the bond rate from the prior 
month, the fraction of unrevised forecasts in each of the 2 to 6 months (8 to 12 months) before 
                                                          
23 The results we report use the data set that omits the suspected transcription errors mentioned in footnote 9.  
Including the questionable forecasts does not significantly affect any of the results we report. 
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the target date is nearly 38%  (over 42%).  The fraction of non-revising economists falls to about 
23% 1 month before the target date (.378 - .146) and to about 30% 7 months before the target 
date (.423 - .118).  A two-standard-deviation change in the bond rate since the last survey, about 
38 basis points, reduces the fraction of non-revising economists by about 11 percentage points 
for short-horizon forecasts (0.378 x -0.299) and by about 10 percentage points for long-horizon 
forecasts (.378 x -0.272).  
C. Estimated Models of Federal Funds Rate Forecasts 
Table 2 reports estimates of our Nochanget models for the fed funds rate using short-
horizon forecasts (columns 2.1-2.4) and long-horizon forecasts (columns 2.5-2.8).  In addition to 
Horizont, Djt and |∆ffrt-1| our models include the explanatory variable |∆ffrtargett-1|, the absolute 
change in the Fed’s fed funds rate target since the prior survey.  We include |∆ffrtargett-1| on the 
reasoning that economists may consider target changes as well as actual fed funds rate changes 
when developing their forecasts. 
The estimated models show that changes in the fed funds rate target exert as much 
influence on the economists’ funds rate forecast revisions as changes in the actual rate.  Columns 
(2.1) and (2.2) show that 25-basis-point changes in the actual and target rates reduce the fraction 
of economists not revising their short-horizon forecasts by 9 and 13 percentage points (.25 x-.342 
and .25 x -.507), respectively.  Similar changes reduce the fraction of economists not revising 
their long-horizon forecasts by 7 and 8 percentage points (columns 2.5 and 2.6), respectively. 
When both rate changes appear in the same model only the funds rate target change has a 
significant coefficient  in the model estimate  using short-horizon forecasts (column 2.3) while 
neither rate change has a significant coefficient in the model estimate using long-horizon 
forecasts (column 2.7). 
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The estimated models also show that forecast horizon exerts no measurable influence on 
the economists’ funds rate forecast revision behavior.  In estimates of equation (1) using short-
horizon forecasts (columns 2.1-2.3) and long-horizon forecasts (columns 2.5-2.7) the estimated 
coefficients of Horizont are statistically insignificant. With no change in either the funds rate or 
the funds rate target the estimated fraction of non-revising economists ranges from 68% to 70% 
for short-horizon forecasts and from 55% to 57% for long-horizon forecasts.  In estimates of 
equation (2) the estimated coefficients of the binary horizon indicators are generally statistically 
insignificant (columns 2.4 and 2.8) and the hypotheses that the coefficient are jointly zero and 
jointly equal cannot be rejected.  With no change in the funds rate target the estimated fraction of 
non-revising economists is 59% for short-horizon forecasts (column 2.4) and 55% for long-
horizon forecasts (column 2.8). 
D. Estimated Models of Unemployment Rate Forecasts 
 Table 3 reports estimates of our models of Nochanget for the unemployment rate using 
short-horizon forecasts (columns 3.1-3.2) and long-horizon forecasts (columns 3.3-3.5).  
Estimates of equation (1) show that forecast horizon length affects Nochanget differently over 
short versus long forecast horizons whereas unemployment rate changes affect Nochanget more 
similarly.  Specifically, for forecast horizons from 1 to 6 months column (3.1) shows that 51% of 
economists do not revise their unemployment rate forecasts with an unchanged unemployment 
rate, as Horizont has a statistically insignificant coefficient.  Similarly seven months before the 
target date column (3.3) shows that 51% of economists do not revise their unemployment rate 
forecasts with no change in the unemployment rate (.696 - .026 x 7), however this percentage 
falls by about 2.6 percentage points per month as the forecast horizon increases from 8 to 12 
months.  In contrast, a two-standard-deviation change in unemployment rate, about 33 basis 
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points, reduces Nochanget by 24 percentage points for horizons from 1 to 6 months (-.738 x .33) 
and by about 18 percentage points for horizons from 7 to 12 months (-.560 x .33). 
Estimates of equation (2), which allow forecast horizon length to affect forecast revision 
nonlinearly, are qualitatively similar to estimates of equation (1). Horizon has little measurable 
effect on forecast revision frequency for short-horizon forecasts: in column (3.2) no individual 
coefficient is significant at the .05 level and one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
on all the horizon dummies are jointly zero at the .05 level. For the longer-horizon forecasts 
(column 3.4) the coefficients of D10, D11 and D12 are negative and generally significant.  While F 
tests reject the hypotheses that the five coefficients are jointly zero or jointly equal, one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on D10, D11, and D12 are equal. This outcome leads us 
to estimate a variant of equation (2) which allows these longer horizons to have the same effect 
on Nochanget by including one dummy, D10+, equal to the sum of D10, D11, and D12. The 
estimated model, reported in column (3.5), implies that with an unchanged unemployment rate 
about 50% of economists leave their long-horizon forecasts unrevised 7 to 9 months before the 
target date while about 40% leave their forecasts unrevised 10 to 12 months before the target 
date.  A two-standard-deviation change in unemployment reduces the fraction of non-revising 
economists by about 18 percentage points (-.537 x .33).  We conclude that the WSJ economists 
are more likely to revise their unemployment rate forecasts than their interest rate forecasts for 
longer horizons.   
IV. Extensions 
A. Did Forecaster Behavior Change After the Financial Crisis? 
 Events surrounding the unanticipated bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
radically changed perceptions about “too big to fail” and the reliability of government 
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interventions into financial markets, potentially changing how economic agents form forecasts.  
Andrade and LeBihan (2013) find greater dispersion in the forecasts of professional European 
economists after 2007.  To see whether the crisis changed how the WSJ economists revise their 
forecasts we compare estimated models of Nochanget for the bond rate and the unemployment 
rate for the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2013.  (We do not investigate possible shifts in forecast 
behavior for the fed funds rate since the funds rate target remained unchanged after December 
2008.24) We report our estimates in Table 4. 
Estimated models of Nochanget for the bond rate show that after 2007 fewer economists 
revised their forecasts when the bond rate remained unchanged and more revised them when it 
did change (Table 4, Panel A).  Estimated models of Nochanget using short-horizon forecasts 
from 2003 - 2007 and from 2008 - 2013 differ significantly, as shown by F tests of coefficient 
stability (columns 4.1a and 4.2a).  Before 2008 an unchanged bond rate resulted in a Nochanget 
estimate of about 33 percent for forecast horizons of 2 to 6 months and about 7 percent (.328 – 
.256) for horizons of 1 month; after 2007 the percentages were 40% and 26%.   A 100-basis-
point change in the bond rate reduced Nochanget by only 14 percentage points before 2008 but 
nearly 37 percentage points thereafter.  Models estimated from long-horizon forecasts changed 
nearly as much after 2007 as models estimated from short-horizon forecasts (columns 4.3a and 
4.4a).  Before 2008 an unchanged bond rate produced Nochanget estimates of 38% and 26% 
(.375 –.111) for forecast horizons of 8 to 12 months and 7 months, respectively; after 2007 these 
percentages were 45% and 35%.  Before 2008 a 100-basis-point change in the bond rate reduced 
Nochanget by nearly 16 percentage points; thereafter the reduction was over 35 percentage 
points. 
                                                          
24 We did estimate models for the surveys before the December 2008 decision.  The results were very similar to 
those reported in Table 2 for the whole period.  
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 Estimated models of Nochanget for the unemployment rate show that post-2007 more 
economists revised their forecasts following an unemployment rate change but that fewer revised 
their long-horizon forecasts without a change (Table 4, Panel B).  Estimated models of 
Nochanget show significant differences pre-2008 and post-2007, as indicated by F tests.  Before 
2008 a change in the unemployment rate had no significant effect on Nochanget in either short- 
or long-horizon models; after 2007 a 33-basis point change reduced Nochanget in short- (long-) 
horizon models by about 22 (17-18) percentage points. This increased sensitivity to 
unemployment rate changes is consistent with forecasters revising their forecasts more 
frequently in volatile times, as the standard deviation of monthly unemployment rate changes 
more than doubled after 2007, increasing from about 0.067 to 0.144.  Models of Nochanget 
estimated on short-horizon forecasts show that forecast horizon had a consistently negligible 
effect on forecast revision frequency pre-2008 and post-2007, as the coefficient estimates of 
Horizont are both insignificant.  Models estimated on longer-horizon forecasts show that forecast 
horizon had a smaller effect on forecast revision frequency post- 2007.  Specifically in estimates 
of equation (1), Horizont has significant, negative coefficients in both periods, with a one-month 
increase in horizon length reducing the fraction of non-revisers by about 4% (2%) before 2008 
(after 2007). In estimates of the variant of equation (2) with D10+, a one-month increase in 
forecast horizon 10 to 12 months before the target date reduced the fraction of non-revisers by 
about 14 percentage points pre-2008 and by about 7 percentage points post-2007. 
B. Are Frequent Revisers More Accurate? 
 Do forecasters who revise their forecasts more frequently produce more accurate 
forecasts than those who revise less frequently? To investigate this possibility we first compute 
the squared forecast error for each economist for every target date and horizon and then regress 
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the squared forecast errors on a binary indicator variable coded one if the economist’s forecast is 
unchanged from the prior survey.  The sample size for each regression is about 50, roughly the 
average number of respondents per survey in our 11-year sample period.  Table 5 presents 
estimated differences in the mean squared forecast errors of non-revisers and revisers, with a 
positive difference indicating larger mean squared forecast errors for non-revisers. 
The estimated differences in mean squared forecast errors show that revisers are more 
accurate than non-revisers but their superiority is weak and uneven.  Estimated differences for 
the 10-year bond rate appear in Table 5, Panel A.  In 24% of the 217 surveys revisers have 
significantly smaller mean square errors than non-revisers while the reverse occurs in only 3% of 
the surveys. The estimated differences are statistically insignificant in 73% of the surveys.  
Revisers are less dominant in forecasts of the fed funds rate (Panel B). In 16% of the 96 surveys 
between 2003 and 2007 revisers are more accurate than non-revisers but in 11% of surveys non-
revisers are more accurate; revisers and non-revisers are statistically indistinguishable in 73% of 
surveys.  Revisers are more accurate than non-revisers in forecasting the unemployment rate but 
only slightly (Panel C).  In 225 surveys from 2003 to 2013 revisers had smaller estimated mean 
square errors in 12% of the surveys compared with 6% of the surveys in which the reverse is 
true.  Revisers and non-revisers are indistinguishable in 82% of the surveys.25 
V. Conclusions 
 The sticky information model predicts that forecasters will not always revise their 
expectations as new information arrives if the expected benefits are less than the expected costs 
of revision.  We find direct evidence for this model in that professional forecasters in a monthly 
                                                          
25 Panel C includes a large, positive outlier for the June 2009 target date in the November 2008 survey (8-month 
horizon). In this survey only one forecaster, James Smith, reported an unrevised forecast despite a 40-basis-point 
increase in the unemployment rate from the previous month.  Omitting Smith’s forecast eliminates this statistically 
significant difference. 
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survey often do not revise their forecasts.  Our use of a monthly survey of professional 
economists’ forecasts allows a higher frequency investigation than other research using quarterly 
or semi-annual surveys. While we find that forecasters revise their estimates somewhat more 
frequently than previously found, many forecasters revise their forecasts every other month or 
even less frequently.  Forecasts of monetary policy in terms of forecasts of the fed funds rate are 
revised less frequently than forecasts of the 10-year U.S. bond rate or the unemployment rate. 
The forecast horizon does not appear to have a strong influence on the frequency of forecast 
revision. Forecasters exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their revision frequency, suggesting 
that the costs and benefits of revising may vary considerably across forecasters.  As found in 
similar research, forecast behavior appears to be state dependent as forecasters revise forecasts 
more frequently in more volatile times.  The evidence that more frequent revising improves 
forecasting performance is weak, further supporting the rational inattention of forecasters.  
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Table 1 
10-year Bond Rate Forecast Revisions 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3)  (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
Explanatory Variable:        
|∆it-1| 
 
-.348*** 
(.057) 
-.302*** 
(.061) 
-.299*** 
(.061) 
 -.302*** 
(.053) 
-.273*** 
(.055) 
-.272*** 
(.053) 
Horizon .023*** 
(.007) 
   .018*** 
(.007) 
  
D1   -.146*** 
(.032) 
    
D2  .128*** 
(.034) 
     
D3  .133*** 
(.040) 
     
D4  .164*** 
(.042) 
     
D5  .158*** 
(.044) 
     
D6  .147*** 
(.044) 
     
D7       -.118*** 
(.024) 
D8      .125*** 
(.031) 
 
D9      .102*** 
(.033) 
 
D10      .140*** 
(.037) 
 
D11      .110*** 
(.042) 
 
D12      .105*** 
(.034) 
 
Constant .292*** 
(.030) 
.232*** 
(.035) 
.378*** 
(.017) 
 .243*** 
(.068) 
.306*** 
(.025) 
.423*** 
(.017) 
F tests, Coefs.of Dj:        
all Dj = 0  4.10***    4.86***  
all Dj = 
 
 0.44    0.32  
R2 
Sample size 
.291 
109 
.345 
109 
.335 
109 
 .212 
109 
.285 
109 
.276 
109 
 
The table reports OLS estimates of forecast revision models for the 10-year bond rate by 
forecast horizon length for the 2003-2013 sample period. The dependent variable is Nochange, 
the fraction of forecasters with unchanged 10-year bond rate forecasts from the prior survey 
date. |∆it-1| is the absolute change in the 10-year bond rate from the prior survey date. Horizon 
is the number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December). Dj = 1 if j is 
the number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December) and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Federal Funds Rate Forecast Revisions 
 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)  (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) 
Explanatory Variable:          
|∆ffrt-1| 
 
-.342*** 
(.070) 
 -.004 
(.098) 
  -.280*** 
(.061) 
 -.151 
(.094) 
 
|Δffrtargett-1|     
 
 -.507*** 
(.050) 
-.503*** 
(.099) 
-.523*** 
(.042) 
  -.329*** 
(.077) 
-.197 
(.137) 
-.353*** 
(.070) 
Horizon -.006 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.011) 
-.005 
(.010) 
  .006 
(.010) 
.002 
(.010) 
.004 
(.010) 
 
D2    .096 
(.061) 
     
D3    .126** 
(.064) 
     
D4    .074 
(.066) 
     
D5    .069 
(.057) 
     
D6    .007 
(.068) 
     
D8         .066 
(.047) 
D9         .106** 
(.052) 
D10         .049 
(.057) 
D11         .047 
(.051) 
D12         .018 
(.062) 
Constant .697*** 
(.047) 
.681*** 
(.042) 
.681*** 
(.042) 
.594*** 
(.050) 
 .551*** 
(.092) 
.574*** 
(.090) 
.567*** 
(.092) 
.545*** 
(.037) 
F tests, Coefs.of Dj:          
all Dj = 0    1.29     .95 
all Dj = 
 
   1.08     .60 
R2 
Sample size 
.147 
114 
.267 
114 
.267 
114 
.310 
114 
 .116 
113 
.120 
113 
.135 
113 
.157 
113 
 
The table reports OLS estimates of forecast revision models for the federal funds rate by forecast horizon length 
for the 2003-2013 sample period. The dependent variable is Nochange, the fraction of forecasters with 
unchanged federal funds rate forecasts from the prior survey date. |∆ffrt-1| is the absolute change in the federal 
funds rate from the prior survey date and |Δffrtargett-1| is the absolute change in the Federal Reserve’s federal 
funds rate target from the prior survey date. Horizon is the number of months until the forecast target date (30 
June or 31 December). Dj = 1 if j is the number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 
December) and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Unemployment Rate Forecast Revisions 
 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (3.1) (3.2)  (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Explanatory Variable:       
|∆Ut-1| -.738*** 
(.095) 
-.699*** 
(.104) 
 -.560*** 
(.083) 
-.534*** 
(.086) 
-.537*** 
(.082) 
Horizon -.010 
(.007) 
  -.026*** 
(.007) 
  
D2  .050 
(.044) 
    
D3  .080* 
(.047) 
    
D4  -.004 
(.048) 
    
D5  -.042 
(.045) 
    
D6  -.002 
(.045) 
    
D8     .027 
(.041) 
 
D9     .010 
(.042) 
 
D10     -.075** 
(.037) 
 
D11     -.080* 
(.045) 
 
D12     -.099** 
(.045) 
 
D10+      -.095*** 
(.023) 
Constant .512*** 
(.031) 
.456*** 
(.038) 
 .696*** 
(.071) 
.485*** 
(.035) 
.496*** 
(.021) 
       
F tests, Coefs.of Dj:       
all Dj = 0  2.11*   3.50***  
all Dj =  if j=10,12     .18  
       
R2 
Sample size 
.287 
119 
.333 
119 
 .324 
107 
.352 
107 
  .347 
107 
 
The table reports OLS estimates of forecast revision models for the unemployment rate by 
forecast horizon length for the 2003-2013 sample period. The dependent variable is Nochange, 
the fraction of forecasters with unchanged unemployment rate forecasts from the prior survey 
date. |∆Ut-1| is the absolute change in the unemployment rate from the prior survey date. Horizon 
is the number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December). Dj = 1 if j is the 
number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December) and 0 otherwise. D10+ 
=1 if D10, D11 or D12 =1 and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Constancy of Forecaster Revision Behavior, 2003-2007 versus 2008-2013 
 
 
Panel A: 10-year Bond Rate Forecast Revisions:   Nochanget =  β0  +  β1  |∆it-1|  +  β2 Djt + et 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Sample Period: 2003-07 2008-13  2003-07 2008-13 
Column: (4.1a) (4.2a)  (4.3a) (4.4a) 
Explanatory Variable:      
|∆it-1|   -.140* 
(.077) 
-.369*** 
(.093) 
 -.158** 
(.067) 
-.353*** 
(.089) 
D1 -.256*** 
(.030) 
-.140*** 
(.036) 
   
D7    -.111*** 
(.035) 
-.105*** 
(.037) 
Constant 
 
.328** 
(.023) 
.401** 
(.023) 
 .375*** 
(.024) 
.455*** 
(.024) 
F tests across time:      
β0, β1, β2 = 0  4.99***   2.28* 
R2 .235 .399  .193 .339 
Sample size 37 72  45 64 
 
 
Panel B: Unemployment Rate Forecasts Revisions: Nochanget =  β0  +  β1  |∆Ut-1|  +  β2 Horizont + et   
       Nochanget =  β0  +  β1  |∆Ut-1|  +  β2 Djt + et   
Horizon Length: 1-6 months       7-12 months 
Sample Period: 2003-07 2008-13  2003-07 2008-13 
Column: (4.1b) (4.2b)  (4.3b) (4.4b) (4.5b) (4.6b) 
Explanatory Variable:        
|∆Ut-1|                           
 
-.372 
(.285) 
-.676*** 
(.103) 
 -.064 
(.280) 
.012 
(.244) 
-.537*** 
(.092) 
-.524*** 
(.093) 
Horizon 
 
-.019 
(.011) 
.002 
(.010) 
 -.039** 
(.018) 
 -.016* 
(.009) 
 
D10+ 
 
    -.135*** 
(.036) 
 -.065** 
(.030) 
Constant 
 
.553*** 
(.035) 
.427*** 
(.047) 
 .799*** 
(.144) 
.492*** 
(.028) 
.578*** 
(.092) 
.455*** 
(.032) 
F tests across time:        
β0, β1, β2 =   4.29***    6.12*** 4.41*** 
R2 .106 .307  .163 .260 .311 .330 
Sample size 49 70  41 41 66 66 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of forecast revision models having Nochange as the dependent variable.  In Panel 
A, Nochange is the fraction of forecasters with 10-year bond rate forecasts unchanged from the prior survey date. 
|∆it-1| is the absolute change in the ten-year bond rate from the prior survey date. D1 =1 (D7 =1) if the number of 
months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December) is 1 (7) and 0 otherwise.  In Panel B, Nochange is the 
fraction of forecasters with unemployment rate forecasts unchanged from the prior survey date. |∆Ut-1| is the 
absolute change in the unemployment rate from the prior survey date. Horizon is the number of months until the 
forecast target date (30 June or 31 December). D10+ =1 if the number of months until the forecast target date is 10 or 
more and 0 otherwise. In both panels robust standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Difference between Average Squared Forecast Errors of Non-Revisers and Revisers, by Horizon 
 
Panel A:  10-year Bond Rate Forecasts 
 
Horizon, in months: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Target Date:             
Dec 2003  .025 .052 -.092 .009        
June 2004  .015 -.061* -.129 -.011  .012 .097 .120 -.010 .231  
Dec 2004  -.015 .116* .112 .246**  .015 -.079 .251** .209 .131  
June 2005  .278*** .055 .106 .316**  .377** .138 .447** .704*** .373  
Dec 2005  .028 .013 .085* .131*  .336*** .182** -.022 .155 .216  
June 2006  .028** .051** .001 -.002  .097 .059 .145 .200* -.114  
Dec 2006  .029** .015 .018 -.045  .088 -.069 .063 .061 .242***  
June 2007  .025 .041 .084 .010  .084 .115 .041 .116 -.033  
Dec 2007  .148** -.060 -.208 -.002  -.904** -.121 -.005 -.183 -.222  
June 2008 .043** .035 .006 .006 -.144 -.054 .077 -.063 -.070 .082 -.199  
Dec 2008 1.308*** -.340** .659*** -.227 -.803** -.242 -.699 -.391 -.367 .382 .390  
June 2009 .022 .463*** .047 .294* .250 .776*** -.402 .051 -.001 .194 -.388 -.200 
Dec 2009 -.023 .043 .106 .097 .045 -.024 .272 .132 .203 .103 .103       ---‡ 
June 2010 .187** .285 .016 .044 .034 .039 -.002 .213 .054 .058 .517* .143 
Dec 2010 .271*** .233** .232* -.080 .018 .111 .361** -.184 .065 .273 .453 -.088 
June 2011 .051 .121*** .031 .042 .087 -.175 .090 -.032 .214** .265 .215 .125 
Dec 2011 -.017 .009 .255*** .892*** .459 .260 .994** .245 -.026 -.243 .102 -1.606 
June 2012 .170*** .291*** .074 .223* -.065 .196** .092 -.155 .493 .899 1.339 -.411 
Dec 2012 .019** .076 .169 .200* .217* -.048 1.471*** -.454 -.010 .579* -.154 .103 
June 2013 .229** .024 -.113** .022 .141** .085 .001 .270** .244** .226** .064 -.110 
Dec 2013 .231* .055 .122 .036 -.003 .247** -.006 -.202* -.208** -.089 .027 .113 
             
# of comparisons 12 21 21 21 21 12 20 20 20 20 20 9 
% + and significant 66.7 38.1 23.8 23.8 23.8 25.0 25.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 
% – and significant 0.0 4.8 9.5 0.0 4.8 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
This panel reports differences in mean squared forecast errors of forecasters who did and did not revise their forecasts of the 10-year government bond rate from 
the previous survey for the target date shown, by months until the target date. Positive differences indicate larger mean squared errors for non-revisers.  The WSJ 
survey did not request 1-, 6- and 12-month-ahead forecasts of the bond rate until June 2008.  ***, ** and * indicate differences significantly different from zero 
at the .01, .05, and .10 levels.          ‡ No forecast revision data are available for this date. 
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Table 5 -- continued 
 
 
Panel B:  Federal Funds Rate Forecasts 
 
Horizon, in months: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Target Date:             
June 2003  -.039* -.076* -.039 -.064        
Dec 2003  .008 .004 .011 .017  .014 .201 .276 .549** .292  
June 2004  .038** .026** -.006 -.009  -.044 -.136 -.058 .006 .110  
Dec 2004  .027** .032** .016 -.068  .066* .214** .226 .035 .204  
June 2005  .001 -.020** -.006 -.036  .035 .075 -.199** -.304** -.209  
Dec 2005  -.002 .019 -.087* .093**  -.034 -.021 .181** .099 -.210**  
June 2006  .024** .016 .058* .040  .080 .109 .153 -.376* .524**  
Dec 2006  -.010 -.001 .012 .015  .040** -.024 -.025 -.043 .197  
June 2007  -.023** -.015 -.150** -.124  .209 .132 .127 .240 .151  
Dec 2007 -.035 .004 .018 .101 .239**  .210 .051 -.319 .019 -.185  
June 2008 -.011* .003 -.046 .049 ---† .265 .975 .356* -.322 1.210 .474  
             
# of comparisons 2 11 11 11 10 1 10 10 10 10 10  
% + and significant 0.0 23.3 18.2 9.1 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0  
% – and significant 50.0 18.2 18.2 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 10.0  
 
This panel reports differences in the mean squared forecast errors of forecasters who did and did not revise their forecasts of the federal funds rate from the 
previous survey for the target date shown, by months until the target date. Positive differences indicate larger mean squared errors for non-revisers.  The WSJ 
survey did not request 1-, 6- and 12-month-ahead forecasts of the fed funds rate until June 2008.  ***, ** and * indicate differences significantly different from 
zero at the .01, .05, and .10 levels.       † All forecasters revised their forecasts. 
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Table 5 -- continued 
 
 
Panel C:  Unemployment Rate Forecasts 
 
Horizon, in months: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Target Date             
May 2003 -.003 .020 .060* -.031         
Nov 2003 -.007 -.015 -.012 -.185  .288 -.106 -.043 .262 .269   
May 2004 -.007** .010 .007 .004  .003 -.013 .082 -.129 .031   
Nov 2004 -.001 -.011 -.010 .012  -.017 .024 .045* .024 .006   
May 2005 -.004 .009 .003 .012  .002 -.011 .011 .007 -.043   
Nov 2005 .001 -.004 -.005 -.003  .016 -.009 .007 .026 .015   
May 2006 .008** .011 -.022 .047  .019 .023 -.051* -.060* .028   
Nov 2006 .024** .015 .001 -.096  -.030 .005 -.004 -.069 .104*   
May 2007 .004 .033** -.020 .037  .021 .060 .100 -.070 -.142*   
Nov 2007       .011 -.006 .040 .048   
Dec 2007 .004 -.003 .004 -.014 -.035        
June 2008  -.204 -.042* .085* -.050 .072 .038 .029 -.010 .056 .239*  
Dec 2008 .003 ---† .016 .425** .106 .083 -.199 -.391 .017 .655 -.079 .251 
June 2009  .234** -.179 .417 -.355 -.671 .935 12.987** .060 .915 -.331 1.178 
Dec 2009 .040* -.158 .014 -.034 -.017 .110 -.202 .483 -.444 3.430** -.666 .072 
June 2010 -.033* -.038 -.011 -.087** .038 .085 -.195 .166 .010 .247 -.017 .599* 
Dec 2010 -.039 .008 .053* -.043 -.021 -.026 .018 .067 .124 .025 .062 .042 
June 2011 -.010 .048 .044 .030 .123* .074 .033 -.115* -.046 .061 -.003 .080 
Dec 2011 .160** -.050 .062 -.165** -.074 -.075 .097** .039 .030 .075 .176** -.037 
June 2012 .008* -.014 .006 .016 .023 .070 .052 -.089 -.052 -.312* .064 .053 
Dec 2012 -.003 .006 .018 -.015 -.010 -.092** .028 .047 .002 .094** .081 .141 
June 2013 -.003 .007 .021* .011 .001 .039* .027 .127** .071 .075 -.069 -.128** 
Dec 2013 .066** -.022 -.053 -.068** .101* -.005 -.147** -.029 -.110 .119 -.160 .091 
             
# of comparisons 20 21 22 22 13 20 21 21 21 21 12 11 
% + and significant 30.0 9.5 13.6 9.1 15.4 5.0 4.8 14.3 0.0 14.3 16.7 9.1 
% – and significant 10.0 0.0 4.5 13.6 0.0 5.0 4.8 9.5 4.8 9.5 0.0 9.1 
 
This panel reports difference in the mean squared forecast errors of forecasters who did and did not revise their forecasts of the unemployment rate from the 
previous survey for the target date shown, by months until the target date.  Positive differences indicate larger mean squared errors for non-revisers. The WSJ 
survey switched from requesting unemployment rate forecasts for May and November to June and December starting in June 2007. The WSJ survey did not 
consistently request 1-, 6- and 12-month-ahead forecasts of the unemployment rate until after June 2009.  ***, ** and * indicate differences significantly 
different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 levels.              † All forecasters revised their forecasts.   
 
Figure 1  Forecasts of the 10-year Treasury Bond Rate by Target Date
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Figure 2  Forecasts of the Federal Funds Rate by Target Date
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Figure 3  Forecasts of the Unemployment Rate by Target Date
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Figure 4  Percentage of Forecasters with Unrevised Forecasts, by Forecast Horizon
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Figure 5  Distribution of Forecasters by Percentage of Unrevised Forecasts
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Appendix A  Questionable Data Points in the Wall Street Journal Surveys 
 
10-year Bond rate Forecasts 
Survey  Target Date  Question       
June 2008  June 2008  Prakken & Varvares forecast is 1.65 with previous     
     forecast of 3.55 
 
June 2008 Dec 2008  Prakken & Varvares forecast is 2.13 with previous     
     forecast of 4.1 and subsequent forecast of 4.2 
 
Oct 2008 Dec 2008  Prakken & Varvares forecast is 1.27 with previous     
     forecast of 3.88 and subsequent forecast of 3.68 
 
Nov 2008 Dec 2008  Sterne forecast is .9 with previous forecast of 3.70 and  
     subsequent forecast of 3.00 
 
Oct 2008 June 2009  Prakken & Varvares forecast is 1.13 with previous     
     forecast of 4.35 and subsequent forecast of 3.36 
 
Nov 2008 June 2009  Sterne forecast is 1.3 with previous forecast of 3.70 and  
     subsequent forecast of 3.50 
 
Dec 2008 June 2009  Wilson forecast is 1.65 with previous forecast of 2.89 and    
     subsequent forecast of 2.80 
 
Fed funds rate forecasts  
 
Feb 2003 June 2003  Shilling forecast is .05 with previous forecast of 2.89 and    
     subsequent forecast of 2.80 
 
Sept 2009 Dec 2009  Johnson forecasts are recorded as -.125 instead of .125  
 
June 2011 Dec 2011  Maki forecast is .0125 with previous forecast of .125 and    
     subsequent forecast of .125 
 
June 2011 June 2012  Maki forecast is .0125 with previous forecast of .125 and    
     subsequent forecast of .125 
 
July 2012 June 2013  Several cases of forecasts recorded as .0125 with previous    
     and subsequent forecasts of .125 
 
 
Unemployment rate forecasts 
 
Feb 2006 May 2006  Swonk forecast of 3.4 with previous forecast of 5.0 and    
     subsequent forecast of 4.8 
 
Feb 2006 Nov 2006  Swonk forecast of 3.6 with previous forecast of 5.0 and    
     subsequent forecast of 4.7 
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August 2006 Nov 2006  Duncan forecast of 2.8 with previous forecast of 4.8 and    
     subsequent forecast of 4.8 
 
May 2008 June 2008  Sterne forecast is 2.9 with previous forecast of 5.2  
 
May 2008 Dec 2008  Sterne forecast is 2.4 with previous forecast of 5.0 and    
     subsequent forecast of 5.1 
 
Dec 2008 Dec 2008  Brinkman forecast of 8.3 with previous forecast of 6.9    
    
Feb 2009 June 2009  Meil forecast is 5.8 with previous forecast of 8.3 and    
     subsequent forecast of 9.0 
 
Nov 2013 Dec 2013  Handler forecast is 1.7 and probably should be 7.1 
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Appendix B   Model Estimates Using Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood Estimation 
 
Table B1 
10-year Bond Rate Forecast Revisions (Estimates using Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) 
 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3)  (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
Explanatory Variable:        
|∆it-1| 
 
-2.365*** 
(.390) 
[-.416] 
 
-1.794*** 
(.378) 
[-.364] 
-1.773*** 
(.385) 
[-.360] 
 -1.513*** 
(.281) 
[-.339] 
-1.403*** 
(.287) 
[-.314] 
-1.390*** 
(.285) 
[-.311] 
Horizon .116*** 
(.037) 
    [024] 
   .081** 
(.032) 
[.018] 
  
D1 or D7   -.934*** 
(.262) 
[-.159] 
 
   -.580*** 
(.127) 
[-.121] 
D2 or D8  .851*** 
(.264) 
[.189] 
 
   .615*** 
(.145) 
[.144] 
 
D3 or D9  .862*** 
(.286) 
[.192] 
 
   .504*** 
(.159) 
[.118] 
 
D4 or D10  1.016*** 
(.285) 
[.228] 
 
   .676*** 
(.168) 
[.159] 
 
D5 or D11  .984*** 
(.296) 
[.220] 
 
   .543*** 
(.194) 
[.127] 
 
D6 or D12  .952*** 
(.293) 
[.217] 
 
   .530 
(.159) 
[.125] 
 
Constant -.869*** 
(.160) 
-1.354*** 
(.275) 
-.427*** 
(.082) 
 -1.092*** 
(.310) 
-.845*** 
(.128) 
-.268*** 
(.075) 
 
χ2   tests, Coefs.of Dj: 
       
all Dj = 0     13.89***       23.01***  
all Dj =       1.93         1.43  
 
Sample size 
 
109 
 
109 
 
109 
  
109 
 
109 
 
109 
 
See notes for Table 1. The marginal effects, comparable to the OLS estimates in Table 1, appear in brackets. The standard 
errors for the Papke-Wooldridge estimated coefficients appear in parentheses. 
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Table B2 
Federal Funds Rate Forecast Revisions (Estimates using Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) 
 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)  (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) 
Explanatory Variable:          
|∆ffrt-1| 
 
-1.569*** 
(.417) 
[-.365] 
 
 .022 
(.544) 
[.005] 
  -1.262*** 
(.349) 
[-.309] 
 -.717 
(.461) 
[-.175] 
 
|Δffrtargett-1|     
 
  -2.375*** 
(.397) 
[-.553] 
 
-2.393*** 
(.656) 
[-.558] 
-2.545*** 
(.370) 
[-.593] 
  -1.405*** 
(.402) 
[-.343] 
-.807 
(.620) 
[-.197] 
-1.529*** 
(.379) 
[-.374] 
Horizon -.024 
(.052) 
[-.005] 
-.023 
(.046) 
[-.005] 
-.023 
(.047) 
[-.005] 
  .028 
(.041) 
[.007] 
 
.008 
(.040) 
[.002] 
.019 
(.041) 
[.005] 
 
 
D2 or D8 
   .433 
(.258) 
[.087] 
 
    .267 
(.188) 
[.064] 
D3 or D9    .597** 
(.282) 
[.131] 
    .443** 
(.214) 
[.105] 
 
D4 or D10 
    
.330 
(.278) 
[.074] 
 
     
.198 
(.229) 
[.048] 
D5 or D11    .289 
(.234) 
[.066] 
 
    .181 
(.204) 
[.044] 
D6 or D12    .037 
(.276) 
[.008] 
    .065 
(.247) 
[.016] 
Constant .822*** 
(.206) 
.771*** 
(.189) 
.770*** 
(.187) 
.381* 
(.202) 
 .192 
(.378) 
.309 
(.373) 
.264 
(.381) 
.186 
(.145) 
 
χ2 tests, Coefs.of Dj: 
         
all Dj = 0       7.09         4.97 
all Dj =       4.89         2.55 
 
Sample size 
 
114 
 
114 
 
114 
 
114 
  
113 
 
113 
 
113 
 
113 
 
See notes for Table 2 and Table B1  
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Table B3 
Unemployment Rate Forecast Revisions (Estimates using Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) 
 
 
Horizon Length: 1-6 months  7-12 months 
Column: (3.1) (3.2)  (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Explanatory Variable:       
|∆Ut-1| 
 
-3.440*** 
(.511) 
[-.804] 
-3.259*** 
(.535) 
[-.762] 
 -2.564*** 
(.415) 
[-.600] 
-2.455*** 
(.420) 
[-.575] 
-2.462*** 
(.411) 
[-.576] 
 
Horizon 
 
-.045 
(.032) 
[-.010] 
   
-.114*** 
(.013) 
[-.027] 
 
 
 
D2 or D8  .205 
(.190) 
[.049] 
  .112 
(.165) 
[.026] 
 
D3 or D9  .328* 
(.199) 
[.078] 
  .038 
(.170) 
[.009] 
 
D4 or D10  -.035 
(.211) 
[-.008] 
  -.331** 
(.161) 
[-.075] 
 
D5 or D11  -.211 
(.204) 
[-.048] 
  -.354* 
(.200) 
[-.080] 
 
D6 or D12  -.026 
(.194) 
[-.006] 
  -.454** 
(.203) 
[-.100] 
 
D10+                                                              -.418*** 
(.102) 
[-.097] 
Constant .102 
(.134) 
-.141 
(.165) 
 .905** 
(.311) 
-.029 
(.144) 
.022 
(.088) 
 
χ2  tests, Coefs.of Dj: 
      
all Dj = 0    10.75*      18.05***  
all Dj =    10.58**      16.66***  
       
Sample size 119 119 
 
 
 107 107 107 
 
See notes for Table 3 and Table 1B 
 
